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INTRODUCTION 
In Intelligent Design, Christopher Buccafusco, Mark A. Lemley, 
and Jonathan S. Masur make a compelling case against the United 
States’ current full-cumulation approach to design protection, which 
allows designers to obtain protection for a qualifying design under 
copyright, trademark, and design patent law all at the same time and 
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without any requirement of election.1 They also argue that design 
rights, including design patents, “have become too powerful” and 
suggest several “policy changes designed to bring design rights more in 
line with social welfare.”2 
But while Buccafusco, Lemley, and Masur express great concern 
about what design patents cover, they do not discuss how the current 
test for design patent infringement actually works.3 Under that test, 
which was set forth ten years ago by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,4 design patents 
are given a much narrower scope than the cases discussed in Intelligent 
Design might seem to suggest. While this does not undermine the 
larger argument made by Buccafusco, Lemley, and Masur—namely, 
that we should not allow designers to gain the functional equivalent of 
a utility patent using the design patent system—it does affect the way 
we should evaluate some of their proposed policy solutions.5 
 
 1. See Christopher Buccafusco, Mark A. Lemley & Jonathan S. Masur, Intelligent Design, 
68 DUKE L.J. 75, 121–23 (2018); cf. Estelle Derclaye, Introduction, in THE COPYRIGHT/DESIGN 
INTERFACE: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 6 (Estelle Derclaye, ed. 2018) (defining a “full 
cumulation” system of copyright and design protection as one where both rights “can subsist if 
the protection requirements are fulfilled and the two laws apply in tandem whether it raises 
regime clashes and/or overprotection, or not. In other words, there are no mechanisms in the 
legislation to deal with these problems.”). Other scholars have also noted the problem of overlap 
in this area. E.g., Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, The Law of Look and Feel, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
529, 532 (2017) (noting that “the cumulative effect of overlapping exclusive rights is likely to lead 
to overprotection”).  
 2. Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 124. 
 3. They do cite the case that set forth that test and note that it “do[es]not enable claimants 
to protect downstream ‘derivatives’ of their designs.” Id. at 103 n.141 (citing Egyptian Goddess, 
Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)). But they don’t discuss how courts 
have applied the Egyptian Goddess test. 
 4. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 674. Although, “[i]n Egyptian Goddess, the Federal 
Circuit incorporated some of the language from—and suggested that it was adopting—the test 
announced by the Supreme Court in Gorham Manufacturing Co. v. White,” the Goddess test is 
actually different. See Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, 32 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1, 11 n.64 (2017) (discussing one of those differences) (referring to Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 
81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871)) [hereinafter Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887]. 
Indeed, shortly after the decision came out, leading practitioners noted that the Goddess test was 
different. See Christopher V. Carani, The New “Extra-Ordinary” Observer Test for Design Patent 
Infringement—On A Crash Course with the Supreme Court’s Precedent in Gorham v. White, 8 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 354, 380 (2009) (“The Federal Circuit’s holdings in Arminak 
and Egyptian Goddess improperly replace the ordinary observer test with an ‘extra-ordinary 
observer’ test.”); James Juo, Egyptian Goddess: Rebooting Design Patents and Resurrecting 
Whitman Saddle, 18 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 429, 430 (2009) (characterizing Goddess as 
“reinterpret[ing] Gorham v. White”).  
 5. Not all of their proposals would be affected by this analysis. For example, Buccafusco, 
Lemley, and Masur “suggest that the PTO increase application and maintenance fees for design 
patents and use the money for improved examination.” Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 
1, at 81 (footnote omitted). For the record, I agree. See Sarah Burstein, Costly Designs, 77 OHIO 
96 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 68:94 
Under Egyptian Goddess, the presumptive scope of a design 
patent is narrow and may be further narrowed if there is close prior art. 
Therefore, at least two of the proposals in Intelligent Design—namely, 
functionality screening, invalidity based on “principal features,” and 
adding an independent invention defense—may not be either 
appropriate or necessary. Adopting such proposals may have the 
unintended consequence of expanding or unnecessarily confusing 
design patent doctrine, results clearly not intended by the authors of 
Intelligent Design. Instead, a policy lever not discussed by Buccafusco, 
Lemley, and Masur—namely, statutory subject matter—may be more 
helpful in addressing the very valid concerns raised in Intelligent 
Design.6   
This response will explain how courts analyze design patent 
infringement under the Federal Circuit’s Egyptian Goddess test. Then, 
it will discuss how the contemporary test for infringement might affect 
some of the solutions proposed in Intelligent Design. Finally, it 
discusses how the question of what constitutes proper statutory subject 
matter may be a more fruitful policy lever to explore in addressing 
these important issues of design patent law and policy.  
I. DESIGN PATENT INFRINGEMENT UNDER EGYPTIAN GODDESS 
The en banc Federal Circuit set forth the current test for design 
patent infringement in its 2008 decision in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. 
Swisa, Inc.7 Under Egyptian Goddess, a design patent is infringed when 
“an ordinary observer, familiar with the prior art, would be deceived 
into thinking that the accused design was the same as the patented 
design.”8 This is a test of visual similarity, not a test of trademark-like 
 
ST. L.J. 107, 156–57 (2016) (arguing that the USPTO’s current costly screen for design patents 
“could be enhanced by making broader claims even more expensive” and providing details about 
how that might be accomplished); id. at 156 n.282 (suggesting that “the PTO could also impose 
maintenance fees for design patents”); id. at 157 (“Implementing any—or all—of these increases 
could also help strengthen the PTO’s substantive screen by raising funds to purchase, develop or 
commission the development of better image-search technology for design patent examiners.”). 
 6. On the concept of “policy levers” in IP law, see, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, 
Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1579 (2003); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne 
Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1581 (2002). 
 7. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678. The Federal Circuit has had exclusive jurisdiction 
over patent appeals, including design patent appeals, since 1982. See Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1982) (providing the Federal Circuit with 
jurisdiction over all civil actions “arising under . . . any Acts of Congress relating to patents”). 
 8. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 672; see also Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 
1887, supra note 4, at 11 (“In this context, ‘the patented design’ means ‘the claimed design.’ 
Therefore, in analyzing infringement, the fact finder must compare the claimed portion of the 
design—i.e., whatever is shown in solid lines in the patent drawings—to the corresponding portion 
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consumer confusion.9 And “the proper inquiry” is “whether the 
accused design has appropriated the claimed design as a whole.”10 As 
to how courts should conduct this inquiry, the Federal Circuit stated:  
In some instances, the claimed design and the accused design will be 
sufficiently distinct that it will be clear without more that the patentee 
has not met its burden of proving the two designs would appear 
“substantially the same” to the ordinary observer . . . . In other 
instances, when the claimed and accused designs are not plainly 
dissimilar, resolution of the question whether the ordinary observer 
would consider the two designs to be substantially the same will 
benefit from a comparison of the claimed and accused designs with 
the prior art, as in many of the cases discussed above and in the case 
at bar. Where there are many examples of similar prior art 
designs, . . . differences between the claimed and accused designs that 
might not be noticeable in the abstract can become significant to the 
hypothetical ordinary observer who is conversant with the prior art.11 
This suggests a two-part framework for analyzing claims of design 
patent infringement.12  
 
of the accused design.” (citing Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 662; Hutzler Mfg. Co. v. Bradshaw 
Int’l, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-07211, 2012 WL 3031150, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2012) (footnotes 
omitted)). “If a patentee is able to show that there is no substantial difference between the 
claimed design and the purported commercial embodiment, a comparison between that 
embodiment and the accused design is permissible” but such a comparison is never required. See 
High Point Design LLC v. Buyer’s Direct, Inc., 621 F. App’x 632, 642 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing L.A. 
Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1125–26 (Fed. Cir. 1993))). 
 9. See, e.g., Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678 (noting that the designs must “appear” to be 
the same to support a finding of infringement); id. at 678 (emphasizing that the Gorham test 
focused on similarity of appearance). See also Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., Inc., 785 F.2d 1026, 
1029 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods is not a necessary 
or appropriate factor for determining infringement of a design patent.”). This is consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gorham v. White. See Sarah Burstein, The Patented Design, 83 
TENN. L. REV. 161, 177 (2015) (“[W]hen read in context, it is clear that Gorham’s test is one of 
visual similarity, not a test of actual deception or trademark-like likelihood of confusion.” (citing 
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871))). 
 10. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 677 (citing Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 
439 F.3d 1365, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); KeyStone Retaining Wall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 
997 F.2d 1444, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 820 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). Thus, there is no “fragmented literal similarity” in design patent law. Cf. 
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural 
Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 570 (2006) (noting that, in copyright law, “[f]ragmented literal 
similarity is the test of substantial similarity in cases where only a portion of a work is copied, 
without copying of the work’s overall essence or structure”). 
 11. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678. 
 12. See Keurig, Inc. v. JBR, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-11941, 2013 WL 2304171, at *5 (D. Mass. May 
24, 2013), aff’d, 558 F. App’x 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Courts have interpreted this language as 
establishing ‘two levels to the infringement analysis: a level-one or “threshold” analysis to 
determine if comparison to the prior art is even necessary, and a second level analysis that 
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First, the claimed design and the accused design must be 
compared.13 If the designs don’t look the same, when considered in a 
vacuum, there is no infringement as a matter of law.14 We might think 
of this step as setting forth the “presumptive scope” of a design 
patent.15 Second, if the designs are “not plainly dissimilar,” the prior 
art may be used to narrow the presumptive scope of the patent.16  
  
 
accounts for prior art in less obvious cases.’” (quoting Wing Shing Prods. (BVI) Co. v. Sunbeam 
Prods., 665 F. Supp. 2d 357, 362 (S.D.N.Y.2009) and citing Great Neck Saw Mfrs., Inc. v. Star Asia 
U.S.A., LLC, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1052 (W.D. Wash. 2010))). 
 13. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678 (holding that “the comparison of the designs . . . 
must be conducted as part of the ordinary observer test”). 
 14. See id. (“In some instances, the claimed design and the accused design will be sufficiently 
distinct that it will be clear without more that the patentee has not met its burden of proving the 
two designs would appear ‘substantially the same’ to the ordinary observer . . . .”). 
 15. This is also the maximum scope of a design patent. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. 
Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (rejecting Ethicon’s attempt to use the prior 
art to expand the presumptive scope of its claim).  
 16. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678 (stating in those instances that “resolution of the 
question whether the ordinary observer would consider the two designs to be substantially the 
same will benefit from a comparison of the claimed and accused designs with the prior art . . .”). 
See also Ethicon, 796 F.3d at 1337 (“[C]omparing the claimed and accused designs with the prior 
art is beneficial only when the claimed and accused designs are not plainly dissimilar.” (citing 
Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678)).  
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A. Step One 
The degree of visual similarity required by courts at Egyptian 
Goddess step one is quite high.17 For example, in Lin v. Belkin 
International, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that this USB cable infringed 
this design patent:18 
Figure 1. U.S. Patent No. D739,824 
 
Figure 2. Accused Product 
 
The court granted summary judgment of noninfringment.19 Based on 
its own visual review, the court found that the designs were so 
 
17 While a full discussion of how lower courts have understood and applied Egyptian Goddess 
is beyond the scope of this response, these examples representative of the author’s research to 
date. 
 18. Lin v. Belkin Int’l, Inc., No. 8:16-cv-00628, 2017 WL 2903261, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 
2017) (showing the accused product and the claimed design). 
 19. Id. 
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“sufficiently distinct and plainly dissimilar . . . that no reasonable jury 
could find the two designs to be substantially the same.”20 
In Wallace v. Ideavillage Products Corp., the plaintiff alleged that 
this spinning brush infringed this design patent:21 
Figure 3. U.S. Patent No. D485,990 
 
Figure 4. Accused Product 
 
The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment of noninfringement, concluding, upon visual review, that the 
designs were “sufficiently distinct” and that the plaintiff could not, “as 
 
 20. Id.  
 21. See Wallace v. Ideavillage Prod. Corp., 640 F. App’x 970, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (showing 
images of the accused design); Body Washing Brush, U.S. Patent No. D485,990 fig. 1. 
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a matter of law, prove that the designs appear substantially the same.”22 
In an unpublished decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed.23 
In Performance Designed Products LLC v. Mad Catz, Inc., the 
plaintiff alleged that this video game controller infringed this design 
patent:24 
Figure 5. U.S. Patent No. D624,078 
Figure 6. Accused Product 
 
 
 22. Wallace v. Ideavillage Prods. Corp., No. 2:06-cv-05673, 2014 WL 4637216, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 15, 2014).  
 23. Wallace, 640 F. App’x at 975. 
 24. See Performance Designed Prods. LLC v. Mad Catz, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00629, 2016 WL 
3552063 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2016) (discussing plaintiff’s infringement claim); Asymmetrical Video 
Game Controller, U.S. Patent No. D624,078 fig. 1 (showing the front view of the claimed design); 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Mad Catz, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss 
Complaint for Patent Infringement Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 4, Performance 
Designed Prods. LLC v. Mad Catz, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00629 (S.D. Cal. May 4, 2016), ECF 14-1 
(showing the front view of the accused product). 
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The judge dismissed the claim with prejudice under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that these designs were so 
“plainly dissimilar” under Egyptian Goddess that any attempt to 
amend the claim would be “futile.”25 
In all three of these cases, the courts decided that the accused 
designs did not look similar enough to infringe, as a matter of law, 
based on abstract visual comparison alone.26 They are good examples 
of how narrow the presumptive scope of a design patent is under 
Egyptian Goddess.27 
B. Step Two 
Under Egyptian Goddess, the presumptive scope of a design 
patent can be further narrowed using the prior art.28 This is done by 
visually comparing the claimed design, accused design, and any 
relevant prior art identified by the accused infringer.29 This comparison 
highlights differences that may not have been noticeable at step one.30 
This second step was intended to “cabin unduly broad assertions 
of design patent scope by ensuring that a design that merely embodies 
 
 25. Performance Designed Prods., 2016 WL 3552063, at *6–7. 
 26. See id.; Wallace, 2014 WL 4637216, at *4 (“Indeed, a comparison supports a finding that 
these two designs are sufficiently distinct and Ms. Wallace cannot, as a matter of law, prove that 
the designs appear substantially the same.”); Lin v. Belkin Int’l, Inc., No. 8:16-cv-00628, 2017 WL 
2903261, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2017) (“Upon comparing the design of Belkin’s product with 
the Claimed Design, the Court finds the designs sufficiently distinct and plainly dissimilar such 
that no reasonable jury could find the two designs to be substantially the same.”). Notably, none 
of these courts expressly “factored out” any “functional aspects” prior to making these 
determinations. Cf. Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The 
district court here properly factored out the functional aspects of Richardson’s design as part of 
its claim construction”).  
 27. That’s not to say this test has always been perfectly applied or that there have been no 
outliers. For example, Apple’s graphical user interface design patent claim should have never 
made it to a jury. See Samsung’s Submission in Response to the Court’s August 2, 2012 Order at 
Exhibit A, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 5:11-cv-01846 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2012), 
ECF 1565-1 (showing the two designs side-by-side). But on the whole, the Egyptian Goddess 
framework has proved quite effective in appropriately constraining design patent scope.  
 28. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 29. Although the patent owner retains the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of 
infringement, the accused infringer bears the burden of identifying any relevant prior art. See 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).  
 30. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678 (noting that “[w]here there are many examples of 
similar prior art designs, . . . differences between the claimed and accused designs that might not 
be noticeable in the abstract can become significant”). 
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or is substantially similar to prior art designs is not found to infringe.”31 
So far, it seems to be accomplishing that purpose.32  
Egyptian Goddess step two also seems to have the practical effect 
of preventing the monopolization of most, if not virtually all, design 
elements that could be considered “functional” in the broad, 
trademark sense.33 If the particular shape or arrangement of a product 
feature or features “is essential to the use or purpose of the device or 
[if] it affects the cost or quality of the device,”34 one would expect to 
find that shape or arrangement in the prior art. The facts in Richardson 
v. Stanley Works provide a helpful example of how this would work.35 
Here is Richardson’s claimed design:36 
 
 
 31. See id.  
 32. The author is not aware of any cases where anyone has been held liable for infringement 
post-Goddess for merely practicing the prior art. And if there were a case where a piece of prior 
art looked the same as the accused design, one would expect that case to settle quickly in light of 
the infringement-anticipation symmetry principle. See Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens 
Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that the maxim “that which infringes, if later, 
would anticipate, if earlier” applies to design patents as well as utility patents (quoting Peters v. 
Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889))). 
 33. See generally Sarah Burstein, Commentary: Faux Amis in Design Law, 105 TRADEMARK 
REP. 1455 (2015) (demonstrating “that ‘functional’ and ‘ornamental’ do not mean the same things 
in design patent law that they do in trademark law”). And by “design elements,” I mean sub-parts 
of a claimed design. The benefits of the Egyptian Goddess framework are substantially lessened 
when it comes to fragment claiming. See infra Part III. 
 34. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (noting one way 
that a product-design feature can be “functional” under trademark law). 
 35. This was not how Stanley Works actually framed its arguments to the court. See Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement and Lack of Willfulness, Richardson v. 
Stanley Works, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-01040 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2008), ECF 30 [hereinafter “Stanley 
Works Br.”]. So the discussion that follows does not reflect the precise approach used by either 
the district court or the Federal Circuit to analyze the case. See generally Richardson v. Stanley 
Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 
1046 (D. Ariz. 2009). But the underlying facts are still instructive.  
 36. Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1291. 
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Figure 7. Richardson’s Claimed Tool Design 
 
Here is the accused design:37 
Figure 8. Accused Tool Design 
 
The only real similarity between these two designs is the 
arrangement of the various tool elements—namely, the fact that 
the hammer and the jaw/claw are on one end of the handle and 
the crow bar is on the other. This arrangement, however, was 
present in the prior art.38 Indeed, according to the district court: 
Every piece of prior art identified by the parties that incorporate[d] 
similar elements configure[d] them in the exact same way. A hammer-
head and a jaw or claw are always at one end of the handle, facing in 
 
 37. Id. at 1292. Normally, the factfinder should compare the claimed design to the actual 
accused product. But in Richardson, “Stanley successfully applied for and obtained U.S. Patent 
D562,101 . . . on the basic Fubar design. All five versions of the tool are built around that same 
basic Fubar design” and there seemed to be no serious dispute that this was a fair comparator. 
See id. at 1291. 
 38. See Richardson, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 1050 (discussing the functional purpose of that 
arrangement). 
2019] INTELLIGENT DESIGN & EGYPTIAN GODDESS 105 
opposite directions. A crow-bar is always alone at the opposite end of 
the handle.39 
According to the district court, this prior art “illustrate[d] the 
functional necessity of placing the hammer-head and jaw at one 
end of the handle and the crow-bar at the other end,” and thus 
required that general arrangement to be “factored out” as a part 
of claim construction.40 
But a straightforward application of Egyptian Goddess step 
two should produce the same result. If the arrangement of these 
design elements was in the prior art, then consideration of that 
prior art would serve to emphasize the visual differences between 
the claimed and the accused designs and prevent a finding of 
infringement based on that arrangement alone.41 This is 
particularly—though not exclusively—true where a particular 
product has evolved to the stage of establishing a type-form.42 
 
 39. Id. (internal citation omitted).  
 40. See id. In its discussion of its claim construction, the district court used the word 
“configuration” to refer to the arrangement of these parts. Id. (“The ‘167 patent does not protect 
the configuration of the handle, hammer-head, jaw, and crow-bar utilized in the Stepclaw.”). 
However, the word “configuration” is a term of art in design patent law that is most commonly 
used to refer to the shape of a physical object or part thereof. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1502.01 (9th 
ed., rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP]; In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203, 209 (C.C.P.A. 1931); 
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 525 (1871). The district court’s atypical use of the word 
“configuration” in Richardson appears to have led some people to interpret it as requiring that 
the shape of any functional features must be eliminated from the scope of the design. See Brief of 
Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of the Petition for 
Rehearing En Banc at 2, No. Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., No. 09-01354 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 22, 
2010). But it is clear that when the court talked about “factoring out” anything, the court was 
referring to the arrangement—not the actual shapes—of these features. See Richardson, 610 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1050; see also infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.  
 41. This assumes, of course, that such further emphasis is needed. The visual differences 
between the claimed and accused designs are so stark that it’s not even clear a court would—or 
should—get to step two. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. But if they did, step two 
should prevent the patentee from effectively gaining control over how its design works—as 
opposed to how it looks.  
 42. See ANNE J. BANKS, WHAT IS DESIGN?: AN OVERVIEW OF DESIGN IN CONTEXT FROM 
PREHISTORY TO 2000 A.D. 55 (2004) (“In the redesign of products, the invented form is gradually 
improved until the standard, or type form, is reached.”). This seems to have been the case in 
Richardson. See Richardson, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 1050 (“The number of other patented designs that 
use this [arrangement] and the absence of alternative designs strongly suggest that this 
[arrangement] is the best [arrangement] . . . .”). Of course, for truly pioneering products—i.e., 
ones that are the first in, and themselves create, a whole new product category—there may be 
little to no close prior art. This might cause some to be concerned that, under a straight-up 
application of the Egyptian Goddess test, the first producer could use design patent protection to 
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II. TAILORING SOLUTIONS IN A POST-GODDESS WORLD 
A. Should We Allow for Invalidation Based on Similarity in 
“Principal Features”? 
Buccafusco, Lemley, and Masur argue that “[w]hen prior art 
discloses a design that substantially anticipates the principal 
features of the claimant’s design . . . , the [U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office] should deny the patent or the courts should 
invalidate it.”43 It’s not entirely clear what the authors mean by 
“substantially anticipates” or “principal features” but, whatever 
those phrases mean, they would seem to suggest a dramatic 
change to design patent law. 
Under current design patent law, it is well-established that a 
design patent protects the visual appearance of the claimed 
design as a whole—not the appearance of its constituent 
elements.44 Because the same test applies to both infringement 
and anticipation,45 this principle mandates a holistic approach to 
invalidation under § 102.46  
 
lock up the best design. See Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 102 (expressing concern 
that a design patentee could obtain protection for a configuration design in which each useful 
element is shaped in “the best way to achieve [its respective] function”). But in practice, it seems 
highly unlikely that any pioneering-product designer would actually hit on the ideal (or type-
form) on the first try. And even if this risk were deemed high enough to shape legal rules around 
it, the better approach may be to work on reviving the statutory requirement of “ornamentality.” 
 43. Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 124–25.  
 44. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The ordinary observer test applies to the patented 
design in its entirety, as it is claimed.” (citing Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 
820 (Fed. Cir. 1992))). So, for example, no matter how often Samsung suggested that Apple’s 
design patents covered “rounded corners,” that was not all they covered—a point not lost on the 
jury. Amended Verdict Form at 6, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 5:11-cv-01846 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 24, 2012), ECF 1931 [hereinafter “Verdict”] (finding, for example, that the Samsung Galaxy 
Ace infringed U.S. Patent No. D618,677 while the Samsung Fascinate did not, even though both 
phones has rounded corners). That is not to say that it would have been impossible for Apple to 
claim just the rounded corners; under current law, the claimed design can be something less than 
the design of an article as a whole. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. But it is to say that a 
claim for, for example, a complete phone screen would not also separately protect the shape of 
the corners of that screen. 
 45. See Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“[I]t has been well established for over a century that the same test must be used for both 
infringement and anticipation.”) 
 46. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). 
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Buccafusco, Lemley, and Masur don’t specifically say that 
their proposal would pertain to invalidation under § 102 in 
particular.47 But, if it did, it would seem to require either an 
abandonment of the infringement-anticipation symmetry 
principle or a dramatic increase in the scope of design patents.48 
And the latter is clearly not what they want. But the fact remains 
that, if design patent infringement could be found whenever an 
accused product “substantially” duplicates “the principal 
features of the claimant’s design,”49 that would be a profound 
change from our current system—and not a change for the better. 
It would add confusion and uncertainty to a test that is, on the 
whole, working quite well.50 If the price of maintaining a very 
limited scope is an extremely high burden for anticipation, the 
tradeoff may well be worth it. 
 
 47. This proposal may be related to their suggestions for changes to how courts evaluate 
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. For example, they suggest that the fact that a designer would 
know it was mechanically possible to “combine elements from prior designs” means that it should 
be considered visually obvious to do so. See Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra, at 125. For a 
contrary view, see Sarah Burstein, Visual Invention, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 169, 200 (2012). 
 48. It’s true that it’s extremely difficult to invalidate design patents under current Federal 
Circuit law. See Sarah Burstein, Is Design Patent Examination Too Lax?, 33 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 7) (on file with Duke Law Journal Online). But, unless we’re 
going to abandon the symmetry principle, it may be worth keeping the rule to constrain design 
patent scope. See id. at I. 
 49. Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 124–25.  
 50. Indeed, it’s not clear that the one factual scenario Buccafusco, Lemley and Masur used 
as an example really represents a problem with the current law or with one litigant’s litigation 
strategy. They argue that the “prior art discloses a design that substantially anticipates the 
principal features of . . . Apple’s patent on a rectangle with rounded corners.” Id. Presumably, 
they were referring to U.S. Patent No. D618,677, one of the design patents at issue in Apple v. 
Samsung. See Verdict, supra note 44, at 6. But they don’t specify which piece(s) of prior art they 
thought should be invalidating. And some (potentially important) pieces of prior art were 
excluded in Apple v. Samsung because Samsung failed to properly disclose them in discovery. See, 
e.g., Order Denying Samsung’s Motions for Relief from Magistrate Judge Orders at 7, Apple Inc. 
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 5:11-cv-01846 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012), ECF 1545. Samsung did, 
however, share some of the excluded art with the press. See generally Declaration of John B. 
Quinn Submitted at the Request of the Court Regarding Samsung’s Disclosure of Public 
Information in Response to Press Inquiries, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 5:11-cv-
01846 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2012), ECF 1533. So, it’s possible that Buccafusco, Lemley, and Masur 
are aware of close pieces of prior art that were not part of the record at trial. Of course, none of 
this changes the fact that design patents are still incredibly difficult to invalidate under the current 
test. But if that prior art were in the record, it could have narrowed the presumptive scope of the 
claims. See supra Part B. 
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B. Should We Construe Design Patents to Screen Out Functional 
Features? 
Buccafusco, Lemley, and Masur argue that the Supreme 
Court “should reintroduce an effective form of functionality 
screening to design patents.”51 They suggest that adopting the 
claim-construction approach approved in Richardson v. Stanley 
Works and rejecting the approach used in Sport Dimension, Inc. 
v. Coleman Co. “would be a good start.”52 However, it is not clear 
that making this change would actually change the result in most, 
if any, cases.53 Indeed, it appears that the Egyptian Goddess test, 
as currently understood and implemented, actually solves the 
problems that motivated this proposal—albeit in a different 
way.54 
Before diving into the reasons for this, it may be helpful to 
clarify a few points of vocabulary. Throughout their article, 
Buccafusco, Lemley, and Masur express concern about the 
protection of “functional aspects,” “functional elements,” and 
“functional features” of designs or products. It’s clear that, when 
they do so, they’re referring to a concept of “functionality” that 
is much broader than the sense that word “functionality” is used 
in the case law on design patent validity.55  For ease of discussion, 
this Part will do the same unless otherwise noted.  
 
 51. Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 126. 
 52. Id. (citing Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293–94 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., 820 F.3d 1316, 1320–23 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). See also id. at 
138 n.319 (“As a matter of functionality screening, the opinions in Richardson and Apple seem to 
strike the balance correctly.”).  
 53. Indeed, the author is hard-pressed to think of an example of a case where Richardson-
type claim construction has (or should have) changed the result, compared to a straightforward 
application of the Egyptian Goddess test.  
 54. See generally supra Part B.  
 55. See, e.g., Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 101–02. Not that there’s anything 
wrong with that. But it’s still worth noting that the Federal Circuit uses the word “functionality” 
in a narrower sense in the context of design patent validity. See Burstein, Faux Amis, supra note 
33, at 1456–57. In recent years, it appears that courts have been using a more expansive notion of 
“functionality” in discussions of design patent infringement and claim construction. See 
Christopher V. Carani, Design Patent Functionality: A Sensible Solution, LANDSLIDE MAG., 
November-December 2014, at 20, 23 (distinguishing between what he calls “statutory 
functionality” and “claim-construction functionality”). See also, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. 
v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (using different standards of functionality 
for validity and for claim construction). 
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Buccafusco, Lemley, and Masur also appear to use the words 
“aspects,” “elements,” and “features” as synonyms for a wide 
range of product attributes.56 For the purposes of this discussion, 
however, it may be helpful to distinguish between these concepts. 
Therefore, this Part will use:  
• “Features” to refer to physical parts of a product; 
• “Elements” to refer to visual sub-parts of a claimed design; and  
• “Aspects” to refer to intangible attributes of an element, feature, 
product, or design.57 
For an example, consider a teacup with a handle shaped like a 
dragon. The handle would be a feature of the teacup that has 
both functional and ornamental attributes because its shape is 
both decorative and allows a person to hold the cup.58 In a design 
patent that claims the shape of the entire cup, the shape of the 
handle is one element of that claimed design. 
In Richardson, the Federal Circuit ruled that a pre-Egyptian 
Goddess line of claim-construction cases—specifically, the line of 
cases that talked about construing design patents to distinguish 
between “functional aspects” and “ornamental aspects” of a 
design—are still relevant even after Egyptian Goddess.59 But it’s 
not clear that this sort of “factoring out [of] the functional 
 
 56. See, e.g., Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 78 (“This grant of IP rights over 
partly functional elements is important. When IP law grants protection to useful or functional 
features of a product rather than merely aesthetic or ornamental ones, it can convey substantial 
market power. . . . If IP law allows claimants to gain some protection for functional aspects of a 
design, it should not do so easily or cheaply.”) (emphasis added); id. at 115–16 (again seeming to 
use “aspects,” “features,” and “elements” as synonyms in a discussion of Sport Dimension v. 
Coleman). 
 57. These definitions do not necessarily match how these terms are used in all of the relevant 
case law. See, e.g., Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (apparently using “aspects” and “elements” as synonyms). And there may be better ways 
to define them that might better elucidate this line of case law. This is just a first cut to facilitate 
the discussion here. 
 58. By “ornamental,” I mean “ornamental” in any reasonable English sense of that word, 
not “ornamental” in the sense that term is currently used by the Federal Circuit. See infra note 82 
and accompanying text. 
 59. See Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen [a] 
design . . . contains ornamental aspects, it is entitled to a design patent whose scope is limited to 
those aspects alone and does not extend to any functional elements of the claimed article.”).  
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aspects”60 of a design actually changes the way any particular 
claim of infringement would (or should) be analyzed under the 
Egyptian Goddess framework. In other words, it’s not clear that 
doing (or not doing) this type of claim construction actually 
makes any difference to the ultimate question of infringement.61  
For example, even without any verbal claim construction, the 
infringement allegation in Richardson should never have 
survived Egyptian Goddess step one.62 The claimed and accused 
designs in Richardson are no more (and arguably much less) 
visually similar than designs that have been deemed “plainly 
dissimilar” without any express “factoring out” of any 
“functional aspects.”63 And even if Richardson’s infringement 
claim survived a straight-up application of Egyptian Goddess 
step one, a visual comparison with the prior art at Egyptian 
Goddess step two would have reached the same result—
protection extending only to the way the claimed design looked, 
as opposed to how its commercial embodiment worked.64 With 
or without any claim-construction “functionality screening,” this 
case should have come out the exact same way, with a finding of 
noninfringement.65 
Similarly, it’s difficult to see how the claim construction 
method used in Coleman would have—or, at least, should have—
affected the ultimate question of infringement. Coleman alleged 
 
 60. See Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1293 (describing what the district court did in claim 
construction as “factor[ing] out the functional aspects of Richardson’s design”).  
 61. Aside from perhaps making judges feel more comfortable with their own visual 
assessments, at least. But it appears that judicial comfort with this visual analysis may be 
increasing as more and more case law accumulates in this area. 
 62. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying illustrations.  
 63. See supra Part A (discussing three such cases). See also Richardson v. Stanley Works, 
Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The district court here properly factored out the 
functional aspects of Richardson’s design as part of its claim construction.”). Therefore, no verbal 
claim construction was necessary to the conclusion that the Richardson and Stanley Works 
designs are “plainly dissimilar.” But that’s how Stanley Works framed its argument. See Stanley 
Works Br., supra note 35. So here we are. 
 64. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. Again, Stanley Works did not frame the 
issue this way. See Stanley Works Br., supra note 35. See also Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 
597 F.3d 1288, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The district court here properly factored out the functional 
aspects of Richardson’s design as part of its claim construction.”).  
 65. See generally Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1296 (affirming the finding of noninfringement). 
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that this Sport Dimension personal floatation device infringed 
this design patent:66 
Figure 9. U.S. Patent No. D623,714 
 
Figure 10. Accused Product 
 
This claim was implausible on its face.67 If the courts had ever 
 
 66. See Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., 820 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  
 67. Coleman appears to have been laboring under what I’ve referred to as “the concept 
fallacy” in design patent litigation—i.e., the mistaken belief that design patents protect general 
concepts, as opposed to just the claimed designs. See Sarah Burstein, Design Law, TUMBLR (July 
2, 2014), http://design-law.tumblr.com/post/90571053836/does-this-reflector-for-use-in-golf-
infringe [https://perma.cc/8P7Y-KJWS] (describing the so called “concept fallacy” in design 
patent litigation). At this point, one may ask why rational litigants would spend time and money 
on claim construction on cases where it doesn’t (or at least shouldn’t) actually matter. There are 
at least three plausible reasons for this. First, at least for early cases like Richardson, the full 
implications of Egyptian Goddess may not have been clear at the time of filing. See Stanley Works 
Br., supra note 35 (filed about a month after Egyptian Goddess was decided). But even now, some 
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reached the question of infringement, this claim should have 
failed at Egyptian Goddess step one.68 
But regardless of how a claim is (or is not) verbally construed, 
nothing in Coleman changes the fact that a claim of design patent 
infringement must still be evaluated under Egyptian Goddess. 
And the Egyptian Goddess test does not allow for a finding of 
infringement based on functional similarity alone.69 Therefore, 
Coleman did not actually give “the plaintiff the ability to block 
competitors who attempt to market flotation devices that 
[merely] perform the function in the same way.”70 And, as 
discussed above, Egyptian Goddess step two provides a check to 
ensure that duplication of one public-domain element alone will 
not be enough to establish a valid claim of infringement. 
It’s also worth noting that the district court in Richardson did 
not actually eliminate any elements (i.e., visual portions) of the 
 
litigants (and their attorneys) might not really understand how the Egyptian Goddess test works. 
Design patent litigation was not popular until recently and, even now, there aren’t any U.S. 
attorneys (at least as far as the author is aware) that dedicate all—or even most—of their practice 
to design patent litigation. Finally, it is possible that well-financed, sophisticated litigants view 
claim construction as an essentially risk-free second bite at the apple; even if it doesn’t go the way 
they want, they can still make their arguments under the Egyptian Goddess framework.  
 68. In reality, the courts never got to the issue of infringement. This case ended up in the 
Federal Circuit after Coleman asked the court to file a stipulated judgment of noninfringement 
so that Coleman would be able to appeal the claim-construction ruling. See The Coleman 
Company Inc.’s Notice of Motion [Corrected] and Motion for Entry of Judgment and Designation 
as Final Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), Sport Dimension, Inc. v. The Coleman Company, Inc., No. 
2:14-cv-00438 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2015), ECF 110. See also Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., 
Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00438, 2015 WL 12732711, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2015) (granting that motion). 
Thus, the question of infringement was not before the Federal Circuit. See Sport Dimension, Inc. 
v. Coleman Co., 820 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Federal Circuit remanded the case but 
parties settled before any substantive decision on infringement was made. See Order on Dismissal 
with Prejudice, Sport Dimension, Inc. v. The Coleman Company, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00438 (C.D. 
Cal. Oct. 14, 2016), ECF 169. 
 69. See supra Part B. Indeed, as the Federal Circuit stressed, under the Gorham “ordinary 
observer” approach, “[i]dentity of appearance . . . or ‘sameness of effect upon the eye, is the main 
test of substantial identity of design.’” Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 670 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 527 (1871)) (emphasis added). 
Thus, mere functional similarity would not be enough. 
 70. See Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 80. Of course, any patent owner may 
allege facially-implausible claims and block competition through intimidation. But that can 
happen (and is likely to continue happening) regardless of whether courts require any type of 
express functionality screening as a matter of claim construction. 
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claimed design.71 The district court stated that the arrangement 
of the “four primary utilitarian” features—namely, “the handle, 
the hammer-head, the jaw, and the crow-bar”—was “dictated by 
the functional purpose of the tool and therefore . . . not 
protected.”72 But the court still construed the claim to cover the 
actual appearance of those features, specifically: “the standard 
shape of the hammer-head, the diamond-shaped flare of the 
crow-bar and the top of the jaw, the rounded neck, the 
orientation of the crowbar relative to the head of the tool, and 
the plain, undecorated handle.”73 Therefore, the phrase 
“factoring out” may not be the most helpful way to refer to what 
the court actually did.74 
Viewed in light of what the district court actually did (and, 
thus, what the Federal Circuit actually affirmed) Richardson is 
best viewed as reiterating, albeit in a long-winded way, the basic 
principle that design patents protect the way something looks—
not the way it works.75 But of course, that’s always the test, 
regardless of how the claim is construed.  
Indeed, it’s difficult to discern any significant difference in 
infringement outcomes between cases where the courts engage 
in Richardson-style claim construction and those that do not.76 
 
 71. See Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050 (D. Ariz. 2009)). As 
noted above, see supra note 40, the district judge’s use of the word “configuration” instead of 
“arrangement” in this discussion seems to have caused some confusion. 
 72. Richardson, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 1050. 
 73. Id. 
 74. This is not to fault the district court judge, who took this language from a Federal Circuit 
decision. See Richardson, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (“The trial court is correct to factor out the 
functional aspects of various design elements, but that discounting of functional elements must 
not convert the overall infringement test to an element-by-element comparison” (quoting Amini 
Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006))). But if the Federal 
Circuit retains this filtration requirement, it may want to pick a different phrase to describe what 
it wants lower courts to do. 
 75. See Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen the 
design also contains ornamental aspects, it is entitled to a design patent whose scope is limited to 
those aspects alone and does not extend to any functional elements of the claimed article.”) (citing 
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Cf. MPEP, supra 
note 39, § 1503.03(III) (“In general terms, a ‘utility patent’ protects the way an article is used and 
works (35 U.S.C. 101), while a ‘design patent’ protects the way an article looks (35 U.S.C. 171).”). 
 76. Compare, e.g., the cases discussed supra Part A, with the cases discussed in the recent 
decision of Dyson, Inc. v. SharkNinja Operating LLC, No. 14-CV-779, 2018 WL 1906105, at *11–
14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2018). Although the Dyson court engaged in verbal claim construction to 
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Thus, as a practical matter, it appears that Richardson-style claim 
construction adds nothing but unnecessary time and cost to 
design patent litigation.77 If, as it appears, the Egyptian Goddess 
framework is already achieving the results sought by Buccafusco, 
Lemley, and Masur, the better course would be to stick with that 
framework and abandon the Richardson line of cases.78  
C. Should We Add an Independent Invention Defense? 
Buccafusco, Lemley, and Masur suggest that Congress could 
help “prevent abuse of design right . . . by incorporating an 
independent invention defense into design patent law.”79 In other 
words, they would require the plaintiff to prove copying in order 
to prevail on a claim for infringement, like we do in copyright 
law.80 
However, given the very high degree of visual similarity 
already required for design patent infringement under Egyptian 
Goddess, it’s not clear that this would actually narrow the scope 
of protection in a significant way—at least for most design 
patents. For design patents that claim all or most of a 
 
“discount” the “functional aspects” of the claimed designs, see id. at *5, it really didn’t need to. 
The illustrations prepared by the plaintiff’s counsel clearly showed that the claimed and accused 
designs were plainly dissimilar under Egyptian Goddess step one. See id. at *14 (“Perhaps the best 
illustration of the substantially different visual appearance of the handheld portion of the Dyson 
and Shark stick vacs is the overlay image submitted by Dyson’s infringement expert, Mauro, 
showing the Dyson on top of the Shark Rocket.”); id. at *17 (providing more comparative 
images). 
 77. See Sarah Burstein, Design Patent Claim Construction: More from the Federal Circuit, 
PATENTLY-O (Apr. 25, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/construction-federal-
circuit.html [https://perma.cc/H3PS-RU3G] (“[I]t’s not clear what, exactly, the Federal Circuit 
hopes to gain by making district courts go through this [claim-construction] rigmarole. In this case, 
the accused product looks nothing like the claimed design . . . .”); Carani, supra note 55, at 27 
(arguing that the “factoring out” approach has proven to be both unworkable and unnecessary). 
 78. For more thoughts on the issue of functionality screening in claim construction, see Sarah 
Burstein, Apple, Samsung & Design Patent Claim Construction, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/01/samsung-patent-construction.html [https://perma.cc/R7KH-
F4EJ].  
 79. Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 81. 
 80. See Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 133 (“[W]e might consider introducing 
an independent invention defense to design patents like the one we have in copyright law.” (citing 
Robert E. Suggs, A Functional Approach to Copyright Policy, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1293, 1302 
(2015); Rebecca Tushnet, The Eye Alone Is the Judge: Images and Design Patents, 19 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 409, 423 (2012))). 
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configuration design,81 the degree of required similarity is so high 
that the likelihood of infringement without actual copying is 
vanishingly low. This is especially true for designs that are 
actually “ornamental” in any ordinary sense of that word.82  
But under current law and practice, a design patent applicant 
does not have to claim all—or even most of—a particular 
configuration design. An applicant can claim basically any 
random fragment of a product’s shape as a separate “design.”83 
For these types of design patents, there is a nonzero chance of 
inadvertent duplication. And, under the Federal Circuit’s current 
definition of “ornamentality,” these design patents can actually 
be drawn to functional features.84 This is a problem.85 But it’s not 
clear that creating an independent-creation defense would be the 
best way to solve this problem.86 
Adding an explicit requirement of copying might also have 
the unintended consequence of making design patent protection 
broader. Right now, a design patent is infringed when the 
accused infringer duplicates the entire claimed design.87 But 
adding an independent-creation defense would suggest that the 
“wrong” of design patent infringement is copying per se. That 
could lead courts to conclude that any and all copying should be 
considered infringement—even where the defendant has not 
 
 81. For example, the design patents at issue in Richardson and Coleman.  
 82. These types of designs are only a subset of the universe of designs that are currently 
considered “ornamental” by the Federal Circuit. See Burstein, Faux Amis, supra note 33, at 1457 
(noting that, according to the Federal Circuit, “‘ornamental’ effectively means ‘not dictated by 
function’ and ‘not hidden during the entire lifetime of the completed product’”); id. at 1456–57 
(“And, according to the Federal Circuit, ‘a design is “not dictated by function alone” when there 
are alternative designs or configurations available for the article of manufacture.’ In this analysis, 
‘alternative design must simply provide “the same or similar functional capabilities.”’ So in design 
patent law, ‘functional’ essentially means ‘the only configuration that is fit for a particular 
purpose.’”) (footnotes omitted). 
 83. That means that, even though Egyptian Goddess gives narrow scope to design patent 
claims, sophisticated applicants can still game the system to obtain broader coverage. This 
practice can be traced back to the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals’ decision in In re 
Zahn, 617 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1980). The Federal Circuit has adopted the holdings of the CCPA 
as its own precedent. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
 84. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 85. I suspect Buccafusco, Lemley, and Masur would agree. 
 86. See infra Part III 
 87. See supra note 10. 
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copied the whole design or where the level of visual similarity is 
lower than the level currently required under Egyptian Goddess. 
Indeed, this is how courts have interpreted and applied the 
requirement of “copying” in copyright law.88 And courts would 
almost certainly look to copyright law in interpreting and 
applying any design patent independent-creation defense. 
Moreover, allowing the design patent owner to introduce 
evidence of copying may actually make juries more likely to find 
infringement, regardless of the underlying degree of similarity.89 
These issues should be considered in evaluating the merits of any 
potential independent creation defense.90 
III. ANOTHER POTENTIAL POLICY LEVER: STATUTORY SUBJECT 
MATTER 
It is true that we should not have a system where design 
patents “cover the design’s utility”91 or give “the plaintiff the 
ability to block competitors who attempt to market [products] 
that [merely] perform the [same] function in the same way.”92 But 
as noted above, there is one way that design patent applicants can 
successfully gain control over some functional features of a 
product—namely, by using partial claiming to limit the scope of 
 
 88. See supra note 10 (discussing the concept of fragmented literal similarity). For example, 
in Apple v. Samsung, “the jury found—consistent with current law—that Samsung’s Galaxy Tab 
10.1 did not infringe U.S. Patent No. Des. 504,889. . . . If Apple had a right to prevent others from 
copying the iPad2, the result would probably have been very different.” Sarah Burstein, Not 
(Necessarily) Narrower: Rethinking the Relative Scope of Copyright Protection for Designs, 3 IP 
THEORY 114, 121 (2013). It’s true that the Samsung tablet looked like the iPad but the iPad was 
not a commercial embodiment of the D’889 patent. See id. at 121 n.50 (deeming Apple’s claim 
“dubious”). Indeed, Apple’s own exhibits in its UK case against Samsung emphasize the 
differences between the clunky, proto-iPad claimed in that patent and the accused Samsung 
tablets. See Samsung Electronics (UK) Limited v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWCA Civ 1339 ¶ 43. 
 89. Cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Irina D. Manta & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Judging 
Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 271 (2014) (finding, in experiments with mock copyright juries, 
“that when provided with additional information about the simple fact of copying or the creative 
effort that went into the protected work, we saw an appreciable upward shift in subjects’ 
assessments of similarity between the works”). Of course, plaintiffs can already get in evidence of 
copying by adding a trade dress claim. But that just illustrates another problem with our full-
cumulation regime. 
 90. For more thoughts on why a requirement of copying and a defense of fair use might not 
be as narrowing as they might seem, see Burstein, Narrower, supra note 88, at 118–27. 
 91. Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 80 (footnotes omitted) (referring to Sport 
Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., 820 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).  
 92. Id. 
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their patent to just the functional part (or parts) of a design.93 
This is neither what the system was designed to do nor is it a 
socially beneficial use of the design patent system.  
One way to address this problem would be to revitalize the 
statutory requirement of ornamentality. This would be consistent 
with Buccafusco, Lemley, and Masur’s suggestion that we “try to 
shore up the doctrinal screens that prevent design-related rights 
from bleeding over into backdoor utility patents.”94 But there is 
another potential policy lever, not discussed in Intelligent Design, 
that deserves consideration—namely, statutory subject matter.95  
The Patent Act provides that “[w]hoever invents any new, 
original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”96 Today, a design patent applicant can 
claim basically any random fragment of a product’s shape or 
surface ornamentation as a separate “design.”97 But that was not 
always the case.98 And, as noted above, a design patent protects 
the visual appearance of the claimed design as a whole.99 So the 
question of what can be claimed as a separate “whole” is really 
important. The use of the word “design” in the statute does not 
 
 93. For more on partial claiming, see Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” Today, 
31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 781, 787–78 (2018). 
 94. See Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 124. 
 95. Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur do, at one point, critique “[t]he current practice of ‘dotted 
line’ drawings” to disclaim portions of a design, which could possibly be read as a concern about 
statutory subject matter. See supra note 1, at 134. But their real concern seems to be the line 
drawings, not the disclaimers. See id. at 134 n.296 (“Patentees would still need some mechanism 
to disclaim portions of the photographed design, as they do today with dotted lines.”). In other 
words, it appears they are proposing that design patent applicants provide more visual details for 
whatever they claim—not necessarily that they be made to claim whole designs. 
 96. 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2018). 
 97. This practice can be traced back to the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals’ 
decision in In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1980). The Federal Circuit has adopted the holdings 
of the CCPA as its own precedent. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
1982) (en banc). 
 98. See Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” Today, supra note 93 at 836–37 (noting that 
the very concept of what constitutes a protectable “design” has changed since Congress enacted 
the “total profits” remedy in 1887). 
 99. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The ordinary observer test applies to the patented 
design in its entirety, as it is claimed.” (citing Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 
820 (Fed. Cir. 1992))). 
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end the inquiry; after all, “[t]he word ‘design’ is mercurial; it has 
multiple meanings that have ebbed and flowed over time.”100 
And it may be that, on the whole, the costs of allowing free-rein 
fragment claiming may exceed any perceived benefits of the 
system. Therefore, the question of what types of “designs” 
should be eligible for design patents is vitally important and one 
that deserves more scholarly attention.  
Moreover, it’s not clear that the type (or types) of designs that 
are protected by the design patent system must be the same 
“designs” that are protected by the copyright system or the 
trademark system. To put it a different way, there’s no reason 
why a “design for an article of manufacture” has to be the same 
type of “design” that’s considered “the design of a useful article” 
for the purposes of copyright law or a “product design” for the 
purposes of trade dress law.101 Thus, statutory subject matter 
might also provide a way to address the problems inherent in our 
current full-cumulation regime.102 In any case, this is an area that 
deserves further research and scholarly discussion. 
CONCLUSION 
In Intelligent Design, Buccafusco, Lemley, and Masur make a 
significant contribution to the design law literature. This 
response has attempted to add to their contribution by 
demonstrating that the Federal Circuit’s Egyptian Goddess test 
provided a strong bulwark against those who would try to use the 
design patent system to get “backdoor utility patents.”103 It has 
also examined how the courts’ application of the Egyptian 
 
 100. Burstein, The Patented Design, supra note 9, at 166.  
 101. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (providing protection for some designs as 
“[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 
U.S. 23, 28 (2001) (stating that “[i]t is well established that trade dress can be protected under 
federal law,” including trade dress consisting of “[t]he design . . . of a product”).  
 102. See Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 121–23 (discussing the problems 
caused by these overlaps). This may also be relevant to Buccafusco, Lemley, and Masur’s 
suggestion that “we might require designers to elect either copyright or design patent protection.” 
See id.at 81. 
 103. See Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, supra note 1, at 84–85 (“[S]ome innovators attempt to 
skirt the rigors of utility patent law by seeking protection through either the copyright or design 
patent regimes. These types of rights can amount to ‘backdoor utility patents.’”). See also supra 
Part II. 
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Goddess test might affect some of the policy proposals made in 
Intelligent Design. In the course of this evaluation, this response 
further identified another potentially fruitful policy lever for 
addressing some of the very valid concerns raised by Buccafusco, 
Lemley, and Masur—specifically, statutory subject matter. The 
question of what constitutes a protectable “design” underlies 
many of the issues discussed in Intelligent Design and throughout 
the design patent literature. The time has come to explore that 
issue head-on. 
 
